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Specialization and trade rest on institutions that protect property rights and enforce agreements.
Frequently, in economic analysis institutions are just assumed to exist, or it is implicitly supposed that
the political game can establish them. Once this assumption is done, the invisible hand does its work
properly. It doesn’t matter if humans beings are benevolent or selﬁsh for the gains from specialization
and trade be realized. However, it is not easy to build institutions, neither are they a free lunch. The
paper shows that ideology, understood as a self-imposed code of conduct, contributes to reduce the
cost of instituting an industrious society, inducing people to assign their time and eﬀort to productive
activities rather than to theft.
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1‘Society ... cannot subsist among those who are at all times ready to hurt and injure one
another ...’ (Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiment)1
1 Introduction
Adam Smith [14] emphasizes in the ﬁrst chapters of book I of The Wealth of Nations the gains from
specialization and trade. He also claims that individuals have a natural propensity to trade. However, in
book V of The Wealth of Nations he asserts that a government is necessary to enforce property rights,
agreements and contracts, because otherwise individuals could have an incentive to appropriate others’
goods and resources instead of working and trading. The dilemma is clear: although individuals could
beneﬁt from specialization and trade getting the goods that others produce from voluntary exchange, they
have also an incentive to get other people’s goods by violence and coercion, do not respect agreements,
cheat and deceive whenever possible.
However, this dilemma was not integrated in the core of economic analysis. As Grossman [6] states:
Traditionally, general-equilibrium models have taken eﬀective property rights to be given and have been
concerned only with analyzing the allocation of resources among productive uses and the distribution of the
resulting product. However, this formulation of the economic problem is incomplete, because it neglects the
fact that the appropriative activities by which agents create the eﬀective property rights that inform allocation
and distribution are themselves an alternative use of scarce resources.
Recently, this has began to change. The ﬁeld of the economics of conﬂict has been using economic
analytical’s tools to model environments where property rights are not eﬀective2, agreements are not
credible and agents can assign their resources to productive as well as appropriative activities. For example,
Hirshleifer [8] presents a model of an anarchic social order3 in which agents have a technology of production
and a technology of appropriation or conﬂict. In this model resources are not immediately secure; on the
contrary each agent can use his resources to productive eﬀort or ﬁghting eﬀort in order to acquire more
resources from other agents and defend himself from others’ appropriative activities. Grossman and King [7]
analyze a similar model, emphasizing the diﬀerence between defensive and oﬀensive weapons and studying
the possibility of an equilibrium where agents assign their resources only to productive and defensive
activities, but nothing to oﬀensive (predation) ones. Konrad and Skaperdas [9] compare diﬀerent types of
governance to provide security in a setting where individuals can use their eﬀort to produce or to ﬁght for
the appropriation of others’ resources. Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas [5] review the literature of economics of
conﬂict. They present many modiﬁcation and extensions of the basic model in Hirshleifer [8] or Grossman
and King [7].
One common feature of this literature is that it supposes self-interested agents completely lacking any
standard of honesty and integrity, who do not care about others’ welfare. The problem is that it is very
diﬃcult to build a political system capable of enforcing property rights and contracts in a world populated
by individuals absolutely indiﬀerent about norms. North [10] states this in a clear manner:
How eﬀectively agreements are enforced is the single most important determinant of economic performance.
The ability to enforce agreements across time and space is the central underpinning of eﬃcient markets. On
the surface such enforcement would appear to be an easy requirement to fulﬁll. All one needs is an eﬀective,
impartial system of laws and courts for the enforcement of formal rules, for the ‘correct’ societal sanctions to
enforce norms of behavior, and for strong normative personal standards of honesty and integrity to undergird
self-imposed standards of behavior. The creation and enforcement of eﬃcient property rights depend on polity.
However, it is diﬃcult if not impossible to derive a model of polity that produces such results as long as one
retains the standard wealth maximization postulate and accepts the time horizons that characterized political
decisions.[Italics added.]
North [10] also stresses that in a world where measuring performance and enforcing contracts is not costless
it would be too costly to enforce rules only based on the dissuasive power of controls. Individuals’ sense
of fairness and internalized moral rules could provide a limit to people’s behavior as eﬀective as external
coercion. It follows that in environments characterized by imperfectly speciﬁed and imperfectly enforced
1Quoted in Coase [4].
2Grossman [6] deﬁnes eﬀective property rights as follows: ‘To say that a agent has an eﬀective property right means that
this agent control the allocation of some valuable resources and the distribution of the fruits of this allocation.’
3Hirshliefer [8] deﬁnes anarchy as: ‘... a social arrangement in which contenders struggle to conquer and defend durable
resources, without eﬀective regulation by either higher authorities or social pressures’. He also adds that ‘since regulation can
vary from total to zero eﬀectiveness anarchy is typically a matter of degree’.
2property rights and agreements people’s ideology can play a signiﬁcant role in the determination of economic
outcomes.
Ideology, often a fuzzy expression, has multiple meanings, although most of them agree in considering
that it is a set of beliefs sustained by an individual or group of individuals. Usually it refers to a set of value
judgments about the results of a social order, i.e., a social justice criterion or a sense of fairness, but it can
also be a set of representations about the way a social order works. While the former meaning suggests a
normative connotation (sense of fairness, social justice criterion, standards of honesty), the latter focus on
a positive feature: social perceptions, system of beliefs concerning social aﬀairs4.
Many authors has employed the latter meaning for underlining the eﬀects of ideology on people’s
behavior and economic outcomes. Piketty [12] presents a model where individuals who believe that the
probabilities of social mobility are mainly generated by predetermined factors rather than eﬀort prefer
more redistribute policies, and at the same time make less eﬀort. Alesina and Angeletos [2] show that
if people believe that the wealth of individuals is more a question of luck and destiny than of eﬀort they
prefer higher tax rates. Di Tella and MacCulloch [15] show that people’s perceptions of corruption aﬀect
their disposition to favor public regulations. These papers view ideology as a set of representation about
the way a social order works. In this sense they suppose that people share the same values regarding
social justice but they diﬀer in their perceptions about how the world works (for example, people disagree
about the impacts of government policies, politicians’ debate intensively about the best ways to reduce
unemployment and economists dispute about the determinants of economic growth. At the same time there
is more or less a consensus about the objectives -citizens desire high-quality public policies, politicians want
to reduce unemployment, economists pursue a high growth rate- but people involved have conﬂicting views
concerning the way the world works.) Furthermore, many diﬀerences in representations do not seem to
disappear as time runs. For example in Piketty’s model agents learn about the parameters that determine
social mobility in a way that even in the long run diﬀerences in perceptions across individuals persist.
On the other hand, Akerlof and Yelen [1] develop a model of the labor market where ﬁrms do not adjust
wage because it oﬀends employees’ sense of fairness. This corresponds more closely to the ﬁrst meaning
of ideology. In the same direction North [10] treats ideology as a component of informal rules5. According
to him informal rules include: ‘(a) conventions that evolve as solutions to coordination problems and that
all parties are interested in having maintained, (b) norms of behavior that are recognized standards of
conduct, and (c) self-imposed codes of conduct such as standards of honesty or integrity.’ The diﬀerence
between conventions and norms, on one hand, and self-imposed codes of conduct, on the other, is that
while conventions are self-enforcing and norms of behavior are enforced by the fear to retaliation or by
social ostracism, self-imposed codes of conduct ‘... do not obviously entail wealth maximization behavior
but rather entail the sacriﬁce of wealth or income for other values’. Thus, pursuing this line of reasoning
ideology can be identify with self-imposed codes of conduct. For example, an ideology that favors the
respect for others’ rights could facilitate the enforcement of property rights and agreements; on other
hand, an ideology that supports and legitimate the breach of contracts could be an impenetrable barrier
to economic development.
Recapitulating, for the purposes of the present paper ideology is considered a system of social belief
that induces self-imposed codes of conduct on individual behavior. The value of ideology as an alternative
and complementary method to enforce property rights and agreements, or at least to reduce the social
costs of enforcing them, is explored. A model is presented in which an ideology of respect for other people’s
goods contributes to discourage theft, decreasing the resources society must distract from other uses to
deter robberies. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model with no ideology regarding
others’ rights is introduced. In subsection 2.1 the basic assumptions are performed, in subsection 2.2 the
agent optimization problem is solved, and ﬁnally in subsection 2.3 the equilibrium is found. Section 3
incorporates into the model an ideology of respect for others’ rights. In subsection 3.1 the optimization
problem of agents who are concerned about their behavior toward others is solved, and in subsection 3.2
the equilibrium of the model is derived. Section 4 compares both equilibria and the maximum aggregate
consumption achievable in each case. Finally, section 5 summarizes the results and interprets them.
4Frequently, but not always, dictionary deﬁnitions captures these dual meaning of ideology. For example, The Compact
Oxford English Dictionary deﬁnes ideology as: ‘1 a system of ideas and ideals forming the basis of an economic or political
theory. 2 the set of beliefs characteristic of a social group or individual’, and The Longman Dictionary deﬁnes it as: ‘1. a set
of ideas on which a political or economic system is based, and 2. a set of ideas and attitudes that strongly inﬂuence the way
people behave.’[Italics added.]
5In the same paper North [10] also considers ideology as a set of representations about the way a social order works and
he argues that how people perceive reality signiﬁcantly aﬀects the evolution of institutions.
32 The model with no respect for others’ rights
2.1 Basic Assumptions
The economy is populated by n individuals. Each of them has an utility function that depends on con-
sumption (ci) of the form ui(ci)=( ci)α. Individuals can assign their time (l) to work in a productive
job (ei),o rt or o b(ri). Every person has a constant coeﬃcient production and robbery function: (ai
rri)
and (ai
eei) respectively, and an endowment (wi) of consumption goods. Some people are relatively more
skilful at working than others. People who work pay an income tax at rate t ∈ [0,1). The revenue of this
tax is used to ﬁnance a police system that, although it is not able to catch the thieves, it can dissuade
robberies by making them more diﬃcult. The protection of goods from theft (p) is an increasing function
of the resources assigned to the police system (the revenue), a decreasing function of the quantity of
goods that need protection, and the eﬃcacy of the police system. The logic underneath this technology
of protection is that, if more resources are devoted to protect goods from theft, it is possible to avoid a
greater proportion of the existing goods from being stolen. However, if more goods can be stolen, the
same amount of resources assigned to the police system can oﬀer less protection. All this suggest that the
protection function must be homogeneous of degree zero in revenue and aggregate income. A simple way





where R is revenue, Y aggregate income, and ε ∈ (0,1) is a parameter that measures the eﬃcacy of the
police system6. Considering the budget constraint (R = tY ), then the protection function (1) adopts the
following simple form:
p =( t)ε. (2)
Notice that, since t ∈ [0,1) and ε ∈ (0,1) then p ≥ t, and as ε is smaller protection is greater for the same
tax rate.7
After taking into account the impact of the income tax, one hour allocated to a legal job reports
(1 − t)ai
e units of consumptions goods to individual i. Alternatively, one hour assigned to robbery pays
back (1−tε)ai
r, because the police system acts as a deterring device making robberies more complicated8.
An individual decides how much time to assign to work and robbery in view of his comparative advantage
and the dissuasive power of the police system. A person can rob others’ goods, but he can also be the
victim of others’ criminal activities. To model this in a simple way it is supposed that each individual








consumption goods due to robberies.
2.2 Robbery and work in a world without respect for others’ rights





















i ≥ 0 , (3c)
ci ≥ 0 , (3d)
ei ≥ 0 , (3e)
ri ≥ 0 . (3f)
It is easy to see that restrictions (3b) and (3c) will be binding in the optimum, otherwise the agent could
increase his consumption and utility without violating his restrictions. It is also clear that restriction (3d),
6ε can also be interpreted as a parameter that captures the eﬃcacy of formal institutions to avoid theft.
7As mentioned earlier, ε measures the eﬃcacy of the police systems and it is restricted to be less than one. A value of ε
greater than one can be interpreted as a so ineﬀective police system that it encourages theft rather than deters it.
8It is supposed, perhaps not realistically, that protection has the eﬀect of reducing the goods that thieves get from robberies
following a linear relation; i.e. if an agent uses x hours to rob, and a police system does not exist, he gets ai
rx, but if it
exists he gets only (1 − tε)ai
rx. This, implicitly assumes that there are enough goods in society; otherwise the agents could
not get (1 −tε)ai
rx from other people. Later on, a condition on the amount of individuals’ endowments is introduced, which
guarantees that thieves obtain (1 − tε)ai
r per hour they assign to theft.







(n−1) , will not be binding in the optimum, or else the individual could
increase his utility choosing a strictly positive consumption9. Finally, notice that the objective function
(3a) is concave and the restrictions (3b-3f) form a convex set, so the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
necessary and suﬃcient to ﬁnd a solution:
α(ci)α−1 − λ2 =0, (4a)
−λ1 + λ2(1 − t)ai
e + λ4 =0, (4b)
−λ1 + λ2(1 − tε)ai
r + λ5 =0, (4c)
(l − ei − ri)=0,
(1 − t)ai
eei +( 1− tε)ai
rri −
 
j =i(1 − tε)aj
rrj
(n − 1)
+ wi − ci =0, (4d)
(ei)λ4 =0,λ 4 ≥ 0 ,e i ≥ 0 , (4e)
(ri)λ5 =0,λ 5 ≥ 0 ,r i ≥ 0 . (4f)
In order to solve the Kuhn-Tucker system it is necessary to distinguish two possible cases. First, consider an
agent that, after the joint impact of tax and the dissuasive eﬀect of the police controls, has a comparative
advantage in theft. Mathematically,
(1 − tε)ai
r > (1 − t)ai
e , (5)
i.e., for this individual one hour assigned to robbery produces more goods than one hour assigned to work
in a productive job. This person will completely specialize in criminal activities, assigning no time to work
and employing all his time in robbery (ri = l and ei =0 .) On the other hand, if individual i is relatively
more skillful at work rather than at criminal activities he completely specializes in work and he does not
use his time to steal. Mathematically, if individual i satisﬁes the following condition:
(1 − tε)ai
r ≤ (1 − t)ai
e , (6)
then his solution is ri =0and ei = l. Summarizing10:













(n−1) if (1 − tε)ai
r > (1 − t)ai
e
(1 − tε)ai







(n−1) if (1 − tε)ai






li f(1 − tε)ai
r > (1 − t)ai
e
0 if (1 − tε)ai





0 if (1 − tε)ai
r > (1 − t)ai
e
li f(1 − tε)ai
r ≤ (1 − t)ai
e
(7c)
2.3 Equilibrium in a world without respect for others’ rights
Now let’s deﬁne a family of simultaneous-static games (one for each possible t ∈ [0,1)), where the players
are the n individuals and, for each individual, the set of actions is formed by non-negative values of ci,r i,e i,
and the pay-oﬀ function is given by the value function of the individual optimization problem (3). Formally:













] × [0,l]2 n
i=1 ;  
V i  









(n−1) be fulﬁlled is that each agent has an endowment of consumption




(n−1) . This condition
also guarantees that one hour assign to theft pays back (1 − tε)a
j
r. See footnote 8.
10Condition (6) implicitly assumes that when the agent is indiﬀerent he chooses to work. Substantive results do not depend
on this borderline case.
5where:
V i  
























i ≥ 0 ,
ci ≥ 0 ,r i ≥ 0 ,e i ≥ 0 .
Notice that, since the utility function is concave and the restrictions generate a convex set the value
function V i[.] is concave. Furthermore, the set of actions of each player is a compact and convex set, so
the conditions of Glicksberg’s theorem are satisﬁed and each game Λ(t) has a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies11. In the rest of the section this Nash equilibrium is found and characterized.
Suppose that ai
r >a i
e for all individuals, which reﬂects that it is easier to get consumption goods by





e, so that individual 1 is the one who
has the most relative skills at theft, individual 2 is the next one and so on. Let N be the set of individuals





e. Suppose also that all individuals











e . Now deﬁne a function f : N → F that





e. Notice that, with the assumptions introduced on production and
theft coeﬃcients f is strictly decreasing12.
Lemma 3 For every income tax rate t ∈ [0,1) there exists a unique Nt ⊆ N such that: for every i ∈ Nt
ri =0and ei = l, and for every i ∈ NC
t ri = l and ei =0 .
Proof. Consider a particular value of t. For this rate, either there exists an individual i∗ ∈ N for which





















e = f(i∗) for all i>i ∗. So f(i) >
(1−t)
(1−tε) for
all i<i ∗ and f(i) <
(1−t)
(1−tε) for all i>i ∗. Now deﬁne the set Nt =
 





every i ∈ Nt ri =0and ei = l, and for every i ∈ NC
t ri = l and ei =0 . If not, there are two possibilities.
For every i ∈ Nf (i) >
(1−t)
(1−tε),s oNt = ∅ and for every ir i = l and ei =0 . Or, for f(1) ≤
(1−t)
(1−tε),s o
Nt = N and for every ir i =0and ei = l.
Lemma 3 simply states that if individuals can be order according to their comparative advantage in
theft, then for every tax rate there exist a group of individuals who completely specialize in theft and the
others completely specialize in work. It also provides a separation result, because if some agent prefers to
steal then every agent with relative more skilful at theft also prefer to steal. Conversely, if there is an agent
that prefers to work, then everybody with less relative productivity in theft also prefer to work.
Using the notation of deﬁnition 2 expression (7) is the best response function of player i in game
Λ(t). After incorporating the results of lemma 3 into the best response functions of every player the Nash
equilibrium can be obtained.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the conditions of lemma 3 hold. Then, for every t ∈ [0,1) there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium for game Λ(t),g i v e nb y :
c











ri = l, (9b)
e
i =0, (9c)
11For existence of a Nash Equilibrium the reader is referred to Osborne and Rubinstein [11] (chapter 2) and Mas-Colell,
Whiston and Green [3] (chapter 9).
12It is possible to alow that individuals have the same relative skill at work and theft, in which case f is decreasing, but it
can not be assured that it is strictly decreasing. Since generalizing to a decreasing f complicates mathematics without any
conceptual gain, the more strict case is analyzed.
6for all i ∈ NC
t , and:
ci =( 1− t)ai
el + wi −
 
j∈NC





ei = l, (10c)
for all i ∈ Nt.
Proof. Notice that lemma 3 establishes that every agent has a dominant strategy, so the unique Nash
equilibrium is just the proﬁle of strategies formed by the dominant strategy of each player. Furthermore,
from lemma 3 there exist a unique set Nt such that for every i ∈ Nt ri =0 , ei = l and for every
i ∈ NC
t ri = l, ei =0 . Incorporating this result in expressions (7) the consumption of every agent can be
calculated, getting (9) and (10).
Figures 1 and 2 show an example of an f function and illustrates proposition 4 for two diﬀerent values
of the tax rate: t =0 , so the police system to deter criminals can not be ﬁnanced (without state), and
t>0 when there is a police system paid by the income tax (with state).















All agents rob  
Figure 1: Robbery and work without respect for others’ rights. Without State (t =0 )
The history that this model transmits is widely known. If there is no police device that deters people
from stealing, or although it exists it is extremely ineﬀective, all people’s eﬀorts are devoted to theft and
nobody works in a productive activity. In equilibrium, those who are more skilful thieves improve their
position because they get more goods from others than what other individuals get from them. Society’s
eﬀorts are dissipated in a costly redistributive game, because for each person it is better to invest time to
rob rather than to work. But these decisions do not produce more goods, they just redistribute existing
ones. A state that taxes individuals and uses the revenue to ﬁnance a system that, at least partially
protect people’s goods, can contribute to change things. In fact, if the deterrence eﬀect is suﬃciently
strong all robbery can be eliminated. However, this is not free; society must use resources to ﬁnance
the police system. The less eﬀective the system is, the more resources are necessary to reach the same
eﬀect on robbery. Individuals’ productivities also matter in the equation; if most people have high relative
productivity in robbery it is more costly to generate the same amount of dissuasion.
3 The model with respect for others’ rights
Now suppose that the economy is characterized by the same technology and preferences as in section 2,
except that individuals have moral values that limit their behavior. They feel guilty when they get their















Agents below       
the line do not rob 
Agents obove the line rob  
Figure 2: Robbery and work without respect for others’ rights. With state (t>0)
welfare from others’ working eﬀort and they can’t enjoy completely their consumption.
3.1 Robbery and work in a world with respect for others’ rights
Individuals now decide how much time assign to work and robbery, not only taking into account their
comparative advantage and the dissuasive power of the police system, but also their sense of fairness and
ideology regarding the respect of the products of others’ working eﬀorts. If, for example, people have
learned in the past a moral rule that forbids stealing and they have internalized it, or if they just belief
that it is not fair to rob others’ goods, they would feel guilty if they engage in robbery. People who value
being honest would probably experience guilt and could not completely enjoy the goods they consume if
they get them by stealing from others. In order to model this moral values a multiplicative dummy variable
z is introduced in the utility function, which is given by:
ui(z,ci)=z(ri)(ci)α , (11)
where z(ri) adopts the value θ ∈ [0,1) if the person steals, and adopts a value of 1 if it does not use any






s.t. l − ei − ri ≥ 0 , (12b)
(1 − t)ai
eei +( 1− tε)ai
rri −
 
j =i(1 − tε)aj
rrj
(n − 1)
+ wi − ci ≥ 0 , (12c)
ci ≥ 0 , (12d)
ei ≥ 0 , (12e)
r
i ≥ 0 , (12f)
z(ri)=
 
θi fr i > 0
1 if ri =0 (12g)
Notice that this problem can be broken into two simpler optimization problems (one with z(ri)=1 ,
and the other with z(ri)=θ), and then the maximum value of each problem can be compared to get the
solution. Suppose that z(ri)=θ,s oi decides to rob. Then, the solution to his optimization problem will
be the same as when there is no respect for others’ rights, i.e. ri = l and ei =0 . The logic of this result is
8that if i chooses a positive amount of theft, no matter how little, he will suﬀer a ﬁx proportional reduction
in utility because of, say guilt and regret; so i will rob as many hours as he would have robbed if he had
been an immoral agent. On the other hand, suppose that z(ri)=1 . Hence, i does not use his time to
theft, and he behaves as a person who does not have a productive advantage in robbery. The solution will
be: ri =0and ei = l. All this can be summarized in:
if r
i > 0 ⇒ r
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Individual i now compares (13a) with (14a) to make his decision. Working algebraically with this two
expressions it is possible to obtain a condition regarding the tax rate, the relative productivity in robbery
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holds individual i will prefer to work and his solution will be ri =0and ei = l 13. Notice that since the right





















r) − (1 − t)(ai













. Particulary, observe that if other people
rob more this increase the chance that a person for which θ
1
α(1 − tε)(ai
r) > (1 − t)(ai
e) holds decides to
rob.
Let’s express the solution of individual i’s problem in a more convenient way. Denote by βi
t the value
of other individuals’ robbery to person i that transforms inequality (16) into an equality. Mathematically,
βi














t is a function of θ, t, ai
r,a i


















individual i’s solution will be given by ri =0and ei = l. All this can be summarized as follows:
Summary 5 Let’s βi
t be the value that solve equation (17). Then the solution of individual i’s problem is






















































































13Again the indiﬀerence is solved assuming that the individual works, see footnote 9.
93.2 Equilibrium in a world with respect for others’ rights
Let’s deﬁne again a family of simultaneous-static game (one for each possible t ∈ [0,1)), where the players
are the n individuals and, for each individual, the set of actions is formed by non-negative values of ci,r i,e i,
and the pay-oﬀ function is now given by the value function of the individual optimization problem (12).
Formally,













] × [0,l]2 n
i=1 ;  
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s.t. : l − e
i − r
i ≥ 0 ,
(1 − t)ai









− ci ≥ 0 ,
c
i ≥ 0 ,r
i ≥ 0 ,e
i ≥ 0 ,
z(ri)=
 
θi fr i > 0
1 if ri =0
To obtain the equilibrium of the model is convenient to follow similar steps as in subsection 2.3. The
signiﬁcant diﬀerences are two. First, now it is necessary to employ conditions (15) and (16) instead of
conditions (5) and (6) respectively. Secondly, since conditions (15) and (16) depend on the amount others
steal now it is a little more diﬃcult to ﬁnd the equilibrium.
Lemma 7 For every income tax rate t ∈ [0,1) there exists a unique Zt ⊆ N such that: for every i ∈ Zt
the solution is ri =0and ei = l.
Proof. Use the proof of lemma 3. Deﬁne Zt =
 






and use it in the proof in
the same way as Nt in the proof of lemma (3).
Remark 8 Notice that now it is not possible to assert that for every i ∈ ZC
t the solution is ri = l and
ei =0 , because for some individuals that do not satisfy θ
1
α(1 − tε)(ai
r) ≤ (1 − t)(ai
e) maybe condition
(16) holds.
In order to ﬁnd the equilibrium it is necessary to separate the individuals in ZC
t who will turn into thieves
and those who will assign their time to work. This is not an easy task because agents’ decisions now are
interdependent (agents that belong to ZC
t do not have a dominant strategy). The following proposition
shows that there exists a Nash equilibrium. Let’s denote by Xt the subsets of ZC
t formed by the individuals
in ZC
t who decide to work.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the conditions of lemma (7) holds and that at least for one h ∈ Nβ h
t < 014.
Then for every t ∈ [0,1) there exists a Nash equilibrium for game Γ(t),g i v e nb y :
c















i = l, (20b)
e
i =0, (20c)
for all i ∈ XC
t , and:












ei = l, (21c)
14h have to belong to ZC
t in order to βh





a positive β. This assumption assures that at least one agent that does not belong to Zt decides to rob regardless others
decision.
10for all i ∈ Zt ∪ Xt,w h e r eXt =
 












Proof. The proposition can be proved carrying out the next steps to build a Nash equilibrium:
1 .B yu s i n gl e m m a7ﬁ n do u tZt.T h e nf o ra l li ∈ Zt ri =0and ei = l.
2. Build Xt ⊆ ZC
t , a set formed by the individuals in ZC
t who decide to work. To construct Xt begin
with ZC
t and exclude h, the individual with a negative βh
t , because his decision will be rh = l and
eh =0no matter how much other people choose to rob. Then, suppose that this person is the
only one who rob and seek the agents whose βi
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. Otherwise exclude these agents from ZC
t as well and denote X1
t the set
that remains. Next, look for the agents whose βi







(n−1) . If there is not
anyone then Xt = X1
t . In other case exclude these individuals from X1
t ,d e n o t eX2
t the set that
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in one extreme, or the empty set on the other depending on the values of the
parameters.
To ﬁnish the proof note that once Xt is found it is easy to see that the equilibrium is given by (20) and
(21).
Figures 3 and 4 show the same f function of ﬁgures 1 and 2; except that they incorporate the combined
eﬀects of the dissuasive controls and moral values.















Agents below       
the line do not rob 
Agents above the line:    
some rob and others not  
Figure 3: Robbery and work with respect for others’ rights. Without sate (t =0 )
The history that this model transmits is diﬀerent from the one of the previous section, and it is not as
commonly recognized. An ideology that favors the respect for others’ goods, and it is pervasive embodied
in individuals’ mentality makes a great contribution to institute an industrious society. Although there is
no external coercion power that dissuades people from theft (t =0 ), it is likely that all people’s eﬀorts
would no longer be devoted to theft, and at least some work in a productive activity. Ideology, like the
police system, changes the relative cost between robbery and work, imposing an extra penalty to theft. The
diﬀerences reside in the mechanism through which ideology and the police system generates this eﬀect, and
the costs involved. While the police system is an external coercion device, ideology comprises an internal
and subjective instrument, a self-imposed restriction on individual behavior. Moreover, while the coercive
system costs resources to society ideology is costless15.
15In the present model the ideology of respect for others’ rights is assumed as a given. However, it is possible to argue that
society must invest resources (education?) to ‘build’ individuals that respect norms by self conviction, beyond the penalties
imposed to violators.















Agents below       
the line do not rob 
Agents above the line:    
some rob and others not  
Figure 4: Robbery and work with respect for others’ rights. With state (t>0)
4 Comparisons
Section 2 and 3 develop basically the same model, the only diﬀerence is that in section 3 an ideology of
respect for others’ right is introduced. The change in results, however, is great. While people do not care
if they obtain the goods they consume by working or stealing it is not possible to support an industrious
society, unless a state can dissuade people from theft making criminal activities less attractive. The costs
of this arrangement are the taxes necessary to ﬁnance it. However, when people have a belief system that
calls for the respect for others’s goods, at least to some degree, they self-imposed on themselves a code
of conduct that commands them to earn what they consume by working. This ideology helps to enforce
property rights and to institute an industrious society where individuals use their time to work rather than
to steal from others. Propositions 4 and 9 establish this conclusion formally. Notice that, whenever people
have an ideology that favors the respect for others’ goods (θ<1), the number of individuals who in
equilibrium work (the cardinality of set Zt ∪ Xt) is equal or greater than the number who work when they
are indiﬀerent about other’s welfare (the cardinality of the set Nt). In fact, those who steal in a world
with respect for others’ rights no matter what other people do (Zt) also steal when there is no respect,
i.e. Zt ⊂ Nt; but it is likely that some agents who prefer to steal when there is no ideology change their
mind and choose to work when ideology is present. Figures 5 and 6 show an example based on the same
f function of ﬁgures 1, 2, 3 and 4, and the following values for the parameters: θ = 3
4,α = 1
2.O b s e r v e
that with the same tax rate ideology allows a greater deterrence eﬀect.
4.1 Maximum Aggregate Consumption
It is interesting to compare the maximum possible aggregate consumption under diﬀerent settings as
regards ideology. Let’s consider three possible cases: ﬁrst suppose that there is no respect for others’ rights





<θ<1), and ﬁnally that
all individuals are good samaritans that feel so bad when they rob that they do not steal even if there is






Using propositions 4 and 9 all agents consumption level can be summed. For instance, if there is

























Agents below the line:
Without ideology steal 
With ideology work     
Agents above the line:
Without ideology steal
With ideology some steal and others work 
Figure 5: Robbery and Work with and without respect for others’ rights. Without State (t =0 )
where Nt =
 




and NR (no respect) indicates that θ =1 . To select the tax rate
that maximizes (22) two eﬀects must be considered. First, a higher t reduces aggregate consumption
because there is a waste of resources employed to ﬁnance the police system (mathematically a higher t
reduces the term (1 − t)ai
el). Secondly, a higher t can produce a so strong deterrence eﬀect that same
individuals change their decisions from theft to work (mathematically the cardinality of set Nt can be
increased). Apparently, this makes the calculations troublesome. However, notice that if an increase in
t does not change the set Nt, then the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and the increase in the tax rate reduces
aggregate consumption. Thus, it is only necessary to consider a ﬁnite number of tax rates: a zero tax rate
and those that make the relative productivity of each agent equal to
(1−t)
(1−tε). Moreover, notice that, since
(1−t)








e. So the relevant tax rates are n+1. The speciﬁc value of t that maximizes
aggregate consumption depends on the eﬃcacy of the police system (ε) and the values of production





e) of the individuals. Suppose that t(NR)max is the tax rate that maximizes



























Let’s consider the second case, when people are not samaritans but partially respect others’ rights.




































<θ<1). Suppose that t(SR)max is the tax rate that maximizes (24) and let’s















Agents below the lower line:  
With and without ideology work 
Agents above the higher line:
Without ideology steal
With ideology some steal and others work  
Agents between both lines:
Without ideology steal    
With ideology work        
Figure 6: Robbery and Work with and without respect for others’ rights. With State (t>0)


































,t h e ne v e r yi work regardless the tax rate or the eﬃciency of the police system. Hence, aggregate










The next proposition compares maximum aggregate consumption under the three diﬀerent settings.
Proposition 10 Suppose there is an individual h for who βh
t < 0 ∀t ∈ [0,1), and there exists an individual
k that satisﬁes: f(k) < 1
ε. Then the maximum aggregate consumption when all people are good samaritans
is greater than when there is some respect for others’ rights, which is as well greater than when nobody
respect others’s rights. Formally: C(S)max >C (SR)max >C (NR)max.










Thus, at least one individual will steal if the tax rate is ﬁxed in zero. This is so because of the assumption
that ∀t ∈ [0,1) ∃βh




α , then it follows that β1





α , then either 1 or j must have a negative β16. Hence, either t(SR)max is zero and some agents
rob, or t(SR)max is strictly positive. In both cases C(S)max >C (SR)max. To prove the second inequality







(1−tε) is strictly increasing in [0,1). Hence, since there exists an agent (k) whose relative productivity
16See footnote 14.
14is less than 1
ε,at ∈ [0,1) high enough must exist to deter this individual from theft. Notice also that
if one agent is keep out from theft the ﬁrst term of expression (22) becomes strictly positive, while it
is zero if everybody steal. So, there is an agent that can be deterred from theft with a strictly positive
t, and aggregate consumption is increased if an agent chooses to work no matter the tax rate necessary
to change his mind. Then t(NR)max must be strictly positive. But if so, t(NR)max can be reduced in
such a way that the individuals who choose to work when there is no respect for others’s rights will go
on working when people respect others’ rights. This reduction is possible because a smaller tax rate is
need to produce the same deterrence eﬀect when ideology is present. More formally, with t(NR)max > 0,


















<θ<1,t h e nθ>0. So, it is possible to reduce t(NR)max while f(i∗) continues




α ). Hence, C(SR)max >C (NR)max.
Table 1 summarizes the results of proposition 10.






























Table 1: Maximum Aggregate Consumption
5 Conclusions
Usually it is not made explicit, but ultimately specialization and trade rest on institutional arrangements
that protect property rights and enforce agreements. If these institutional requirements are fulﬁlled then
the invisible hand does its work properly; it is not necessary a central authority that harmonized the
simultaneous activities of all individuals, neither benevolent or moral human beings. Just if everybody
pursue his selﬁsh aims the gains from specialization and trade are realized. Following this line of reasoning
all the burden of the social order is put in polity. In the model this feature is represented in a very simple
way introducing a state that taxes individuals and provides a system that discourage theft. Hence, the
social cost to support a productive society are the taxes people pay to ﬁnance the system. However,
as mentioned before two related problems emerge. First, if actors in the political game are supposed
completely selﬁsh, they would not probably have the necessary incentives to impose and manage a system
that protects property rights and enforces contracts. On the contrary, they would probably abuse of their
power choosing a high tax rate and expropriating people. In the model the political behavior of individuals
is not included, neither the political game. As normal in economic theory formal institutions comprise the
‘givens’ of the analysis. Thus, as regards this ﬁrst problem the model is absolutely silent; however, it is
important to remark that: (i) employing the standard assumptions on agents’ behavior voluntary exchange
is as natural as theft, violence, and coercion, (ii) a priori there is no reason why people would be a selﬁsh
sophisticated optimizer when playing the role of economic agent and a benevolent person when voting or
participating in political decisions, and (iii) as North [10] claims it is diﬃcult to maintain the standard
assumptions on agents’ behavior and derive a model of polity that protect property rights and enforce
contracts.
Secondly, rules are not a free lunch, in the sense that society must distract resources from others uses
to institute a productive society; and rules could cost too much, in the sense that it could be too expensive
to sustain institutions merely based on a coercive system. All these impulse to study alternative modes to
support rules. The paper explored the value of ideology as one possible answer. Table 2 summarizes the
results obtained.
Ideology, understood as a self-imposed code of conduct, reinforces the eﬀects of controls to dissuade
crime and enforce property rights and agreements. It also reduces the costs necessary to establish an
15Ideology/State Without State (t =0 ) With State (t>0)
No Respect (θ =1 ) Everybody steal. All people’s time is
wasted in a costly redistributive game.
If t is suﬃcientlyhigh some people steal
and others work. A partially productive
society is possible. Taxes are needed to








Some people steal and others work. A
partially productive society is possible.
No social cost to ﬁnance dissuasion.
Some people steal and other work. A
partially productive society is possible.
Taxes are needed to ﬁnance the dissua-
sive system.
Samaritan People






All people’s time is devoted to work.
No social loses to dissuade people from
rob. Industrious Society.
All people’s time is devoted to work.
The state waste resources that are
not necessary to dissuade people from
theft.
Table 2: Main Results
industrious society. Indeed, the economic value of ideology is the amount of resources society does not
have to divert from consumption in order to ﬁnance a deterrence system that secures property rights.
Looked at in this way, ideology becomes a social mechanism that contributes to facilitate trade and
induces people to assign their eﬀort and resources to productive rather than appropriative activities.
The positive shape of ideology underlined in this paper contrasts with others views that focus on
negative features, particularly those that connect it with dogmatism and conﬂict. For example, Sartori[13]
indicates that ‘ideologies are no longer ideas, in the sense that ideological doctrines no longer fall under the
jurisdiction of logic and veriﬁcation’. He relates ideology with people’s belief system, and distinguishes two
dimensions that characterize a belief system: the cognitive and the emotional. The cognitive dimension
refers to closed or open belief systems. He states: ‘A person’s belief system is open or closed to the extent
to which the person can receive, evaluate and act on relevant information ... on its own intrinsic merit’. A
closed mind is just a dogmatic and rigid one. As regards the emotive dimension, Sartori [13] asserts: ‘along
the emotive dimension belief can be intense or feeble, passionately or weekly felt’. Using this framework
he perceives ideology ‘...as a belief system based on (i) ﬁxed elements, characterized by (ii) strong aﬀect
and (iii) closed cognitive structure’; and he concludes that ideology is important because it could help to
understand social conﬂict. Viewed from this perspective ideology is opposed to pragmatism, and it would
appear that it must have a bad connotation. However, as the model in this paper shows this judgment
could be misleading, because it depends on the content of the belief system. In the present paper, ideology,
viewed as a social belief that favors the respect for others’ rights, facilitates the enforcement of property
rights and agreements. On other hand, an ideology that supports and legitimates the breach of contracts
could be an impenetrable barrier to economic development.
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